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The presence and popularity of populist parties – right-wing in the US, radical right in the EU –
raises significant questions about their consequences for democracy, democratic legitimacy, and
political participation. Tim Immerzeel and Mark Pickup examine the role of these parties for a
specific indicator of the quality of democracy: voter turnout. Based on an analysis of 33 European
countries in the period 2002-2012, they show that the presence and popularity attracts some people
to the polling booth, while demotivating others.
The rise of the populist radical right in European democracies over the last three decades has
attracted extensive scientific and public debate. One focal point concerns the consequences of the
populist radical right for democracy. Some have claimed that the populist radical right constitutes a
serious threat to democracy because its leaders employ a radical notion of democracy that
emphasises a homogenous ‘people’ and excludes minorities. However, others have noted that the
populist radical right actually correct democratic deficiencies by speaking to a large group of
citizens disillusioned with mainstream politicians and parties. These people, who feel that there is
finally someone who listens to their grievances, may find the way (back) to the polling booth, thus
boosting general turnout numbers (cf. Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012).
Although the question of whether the populist radical right constitutes a ‘threat or corrective’ to democracy is usually
a normative one, the question of whether there is a relationship between the popularity of the populist radical right
and voter turnout can be empirically tested. Does the populist radical right, indeed, play a role in encouraging or
discouraging citizens to go to the polling booth, and why? In our recent study, we address this question. Drawing
upon different theories, such as electoral competition (Franklin, 2004), we expect that a successful populist radical
right party fosters voter turnout because it is a passionate mobiliser that fulfils a watchdog function and reintroduces
electoral competition. Additionally, we argue that the populist radical right will be especially successful in doing so
among those who favour populist radical right policies: the less educated, the blue-collar workers, the unemployed,
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the politically dissatisfied, and those with negative attitudes toward immigrants. In addition, we develop a competing
hypothesis that the populist radical right could inhibit voter turnout because it introduces a more negative, hardened
tone to the political debate that further triggers distrust toward politics, politicians and democracy. We expect that
this will especially discourage those who are new to democracy: whether it is young voters in more established
democracies, or Eastern Europeans.
Most importantly, our study shows that there is no general positive influence of the populist radical right’s popularity
on electoral turnout. Despite the unique profile of the populist radical right as a populist, nativist contender and some
anecdotal evidence that the populist radical right’s electoral breakthroughs accompany rising turnout, these parties
do not have the general positive impact on electoral turnout that we had expected. In Western European countries,
the populist radical right generally has no influence on electoral turnout, whereas in Eastern European countries it
has a negative effect. Hence, to speak of the populist radical right as ‘corrective of democracy’ is—in terms of
electoral turnout—a misunderstanding.
Yet, although the populist radical right does not have a generally positive influence on electoral turnout, the Western
European populist radical right do encourage some social groups to turn out for national elections. These groups
are, however, not the people who agree with the populist radical right’s ideology. Rather, they seem to be the groups
that are actually repelled by them: the more highly educated Western Europeans who are more politically interested
are more inclined to ‘keep the rascals out’.
Interestingly, in Eastern Europe, such positive effects on electoral turnout for those who oppose populist radical right
ideology were not found. In contrast, anti-populist radical right Eastern Europeans were actually strongly
discouraged from voting with increasing populist radical right popularity. Younger, more highly educated, non-blue
collar workers and politically interested citizens were more inclined to stay home at national election time when the
populist radical right became more popular.
We speculate that these East-West differences may be caused by the fact that Eastern Europeans live in younger
democracies and have less experience with electoral competition than their Western European counterparts. Anti-
populist radical right Western Europeans are often socialised in a democratic regime where elections are
accompanied by contentious political campaigns. They may think of elections as a legitimate method of ‘protest’
against the populist radical right and thus turn out to vote (cf. Hirschman, 1970; Thomassen et al., 2014), whereas
anti-populist radical right Eastern Europeans may interpret the populist radical right’s success as a confirmation of
their image of democracy, politics and politicians as being untrustworthy and corrupt. This results in lower levels of
electoral turnout (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Kahn & Kenney, 1999).
Altogether, our findings underline the claim that the populist radical right poses a threat to democracy especially in
East-European countries where young people in particular are negatively affected by the success of the populist
radical right. If young people do not vote, their interests may be underrepresented in the legislature, and they will be
more likely to become habitual non-voters (e.g. Plutzer, 2002). In the short-term, this leads to lower levels of turnout
among youngsters. In the long-term, this younger generation could pass down their habitual nonvoting to the next
generation, which eventually leads to even lower levels of turnout across the electorate (cf. Blais & Rubenson,
2013). Hence, we conclude that for Eastern Europe, one should be concerned about the popularity of the populist
radical right because it seems to discourage an important part of the electorate from turning out at elections.
___
Note: This blog is based on the authors’ recent Electoral Studies article “Populist radical right parties mobilizing ‘the
people’? The role of populist radical right success in voter turnout”. It was originally posted on Democratic Audit .
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